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1 Introduction1 
The role of the financial system in determining macroeconomic performance has long 
been of concern to economists. In developing countries, this issue has typically been 
analyzed in the context of "financial repression," a term that refers to the web of 
legal restrictions under which the financial system has traditionally operated in many 
such countries. The literature on financial repression was triggered by the work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who advocated the removal of many of these 
restrictions - i.e., financial liberalization - as a growth-promoting policy in the Third 
World. While this policy prescription initially generated a substantial amount of 
controversy, many developing countries have adjusted their policies in the prescribed 
direction during recent years. 
Unfortunately, not all of the experiences with liberalization have been 
favourable, and in several instances, the change over was followed by a financial 
crisis that led to the restoration of various restrictions. As a result, a new strand of 
literature has explored the conditions under which financial liberalization is likely to 
be successful. By and large, this new literature has stressed the important roles of 
macroeconomic stability as well as the presence of adequate supervisory and 
monitoring capacity on the part of the financial authorities. 
Complementing these two strands of developing-country literature, the recent 
resurgence of interest among macroeconomists in the determinants of long-run 
economic growth has generated new analytical and empirical work on the relationship 
between financial intermediation and economic growth. This literature has revisited 
and expanded on the themes originally articulated by McKinnon and Shaw, while 
placing the entire discussion in the context of a new perspective on the growth 
process. Its empirical contributions have examined the links between financial 
intermediation and growth in a very broad context, including both industrial and 
developing countries. 
All of these issues are of potentially great relevance for sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the reactivation of economic growth experienced of late in several other parts 
of the developing world has not yet been broadly felt, and where the identification 
of polices that can achieve such an acceleration of growth is of particular urgency, 
in view of the region's poverty and dismal recent economic performance.2 
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to encourage an examination of the 
potential role of financial sector policies in the reactivation of economic growth in 
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sub-Saharan Africa. The paper provides an overview of what is currently known 
about the relationship between financial-sector policies and economic growth as well 
as about the state of such policies in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper is intended as 
a survey to motivate additional research, and as such does not provide new results. 
Instead, it attempts to weave the three strands of literature described above into a 
coherent paradigm, and to see where that paradigm leads us in addressing the issue 
of what types of financial-sector policies are most likely to prove conducive to growth 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next two sections present a synthesis 
of theory and summary of evidence, in that order. This is followed in Section III by 
an overview of accumulated country-specific research relevant to sub-Saharan African 
countries in particular. The paper's conclusions, offered in Section IV, are in the 
form of some proposed issues for research, motivated by the discussion in the three 
main sections. 
Theory 
General principles 
To link financial intermediation to economic growth, recent contributors to the "new" 
economic growth literature have reconsidered the role of financial intermediaries.3 
The new paradigm stresses the information-processing role of financial institutions.4 
In a perfectly competitive Arrow-Debreu economy in which information is free 
and contracts are costless to negotiate and enforce, financial intermediation would be 
costless and efficient, and it could be carried out by individuals. The market would 
allocate income efficiently between consumption and saving, and then allocate saving 
efficiently across investment projects. For a potential investor, the cost of funds 
would be the same whether internally or externally generated, financial intermediation 
would absorb no real resources, and there would be no role for specialized financial 
institutions.5 
What creates such a role is the existence of asymmetric information (possessed 
by the borrower, but not by the lender), as well as contract negotiation and 
enforcement costs. Under such conditions, uncollateralized external finance creates 
incentive problems, since the costs of a failed investment will not be borne entirely 
by the agent undertaking the project.6 Lenders thus extract a premium to compensate 
them for evaluation, monitoring, and contract enforcement costs. In this world, 
financial intermediation is likely to be undertaken by specialized institutions, rather 
than by individuals, because the information-gathering and processing functions are 
likely to be subject to large fixed costs, making it cheaper for such activities to be 
carried out by agents who undertake them on a large scale.7 Firms that specialize in 
this function also provide financing to investors.8 To do so, they must raise their 
own funds by borrowing from savers. Thus, financial institutions play two distinct 
roles. On the one hand, they identify the most promising investment projects and 
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monitor the behaviour of entrepreneurs. On the other, they channel resources from 
savers to investors.9 
They are able to attract resources from savers because their liabilities offer 
attractive combinations of expected return, risk, and liquidity. All of these features 
arise from pooling. Asset pooling provides diversification, protecting savers from the 
idiosyncratic risks attached to individual projects and leaving them exposed only to 
systemic risk.10 Liability pooling permits intermediaries to fund lumpy, high-return 
projects that would be beyond the reach of individual savers. It also insures the 
intermediary against withdrawals, permitting it to offer assets of short maturity to 
savers. The existence of intermediaries thus permits the economy to undertake 
projects that have high expected return but are risky, lumpy, and illiquid. 
How are these functions linked to economic growth? As emphasized by Gertler 
and Rose (1991), growth and financial development are mutually dependent. The 
level of per capita income partially determines the level of financial development, for 
at least two reasons. First, monitoring costs are likely to be inversely related to a 
borrowing firm's net worth, both because net worth can serve as explicit collateral 
for loans and because having their own assets at stake serves to align the incentives 
of investors more closely with those of lenders, even when those assets have not been 
offered as collateral. Second, costs of evaluating and monitoring loans, as well as 
those of enforcing contracts, depend on the availability of public goods in the form 
of an established system of property rights, suitable accounting standards, and an 
efficient judiciary. 
Potential borrowers at low income levels have little net worth, thereby raising 
monitoring costs and creating a large premium on external finance necessary to 
compensate lenders for the cost of monitoring borrowers and enforcing financial 
contracts. At such income levels, availability of the public goods mentioned earlier 
is also likely to be low. Under these circumstances, self-finance and informal finance 
linked to social relationships are likely to dominate, since the cost of funds raised 
externally will be prohibitive. 
As income grows, borrowers' net worth is likely to improve and the provision 
of public goods in the form of adequate legal institutions is likely to increase. 
Reliance on external finance will thus increase, but because collateral remains limited, 
substantial monitoring continues to be necessary and the dominant financial 
intermediary will be the commercial bank. Only at higher levels of income will 
borrowers' net worth be such as to support "arm's length" transactions involving little 
or no monitoring, thereby permitting the emergence of securities markets. Thus there 
is a large endogenous component to the level of financial development.11 
Financial development, on the other hand, also promotes growth. By providing 
the necessary funding, competitive financial institutions not only permit high-return 
projects to be undertaken. If these institutions are efficient and not subject to 
excessive taxation, they pass on the returns to their creditors, who may thereby be 
induced to save. Such institutions can thus potentially both enhance the efficiency of 
investment by allocating it properly and increase its volume. This direction of 
causation is explored in more detail below. 
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Financial development and growth 
Consider, then, the growth effects of an innovation in financial development. In the 
context of the Solow growth model, the resulting increases in total investment and 
improvements in the allocation of investment would, with a given state of technology, 
result in a boost to the rate of economic growth while capital is being reallocated 
from less to more productive use and before diminishing returns drive the marginal 
product of capital down to its steady-state level. After the reallocation of capital has 
been completed and the steady state has been reached, growth would return to its 
natural level, albeit at a higher level of income per capita. 
More sustained effects on growth are possible if the productive factor that the 
economy can accumulate endogenously is not subject to diminishing returns. To 
study the effects of financial development on growth in this setting, consider the 
simplest possible model consistent with endogenous long-run growth. This is one in 
which the aggregate production function is given by an "AK" technology (Rebelo, 
1991), and the saving rate is constant: 
Y-AK (1) 
K=I (2) 
I=$sY (3) 
Here Equation (1) is the aggregate production function, with output proportional to 
the capital stock, and Equation (2) describes the dynamics of the capital stock. The 
final equation is the goods-market equilibrium condition, which equates saving to 
investment. The assumption is that the notional saving rate is constant, with a value 
given by the parameters, but that the process of financial intermediation absorbs a 
fraction (1-$) of all saving, which is diverted into consumption.12 This model serves 
as a simple point of departure from which extensions are derived below to illustrate 
particular points. 
The behaviour of economic growth implied by this model is: 
Y=A$s. W 
Thus, innovations in financial development can alter the growth rate through three 
channels: 
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• Improved efficiency of intermediation (increased $). 
• Improved efficiency of the capital stock, measured by increases in the 
parameter A. 
• An increase in the saving rate s. 
Whether a given innovation in financial development affects growth through any one 
(or more) of these channels depends, of course, on the nature of the innovation and 
the properties of the economy. 
The role of financial policies 
Because of the mutual interdependence between financial development and growth, 
the identification of innovations in financial development is not a trivial matter. 
Changes in financial-sector policies, however, are an identifiable source of such 
innovations. At a given level of income, and thus at a given stage of financial 
development, the efficiency of the financial system depends, among other things, on 
the policy environment. Thus, the adoption of policies to facilitate financial 
intermediation can be regarded as a form of "innovation" in financial development. 
To assess whether changes in policies directed to the financial system in developing 
countries are likely to affect growth through any of the channels mentioned above, 
it is necessary to consider the specific policies themselves. 
Many developing countries are at a stage of financial development in which 
commercial banks are the dominant financial institution.13 As indicated above, 
policies directed to the financial system in such countries can often be summed up by 
the term "financial repression". As described by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
financial repression contains several key elements: 
• Restrictions on entry into banking, often combined with public 
ownership of major banks. 
• High reserve requirements on deposits. 
• Legal ceilings on bank lending and deposit rates. 
• Quantitative restrictions on the allocation of credit. 
• Restrictions on capital transactions with foreigners. 
One way of creating a policy-induced "innovation" in financial intermediation would 
be the removal of regulations such as these - i.e., the adoption of financial 
liberalization. The possible effects of financial liberalization on growth through the 
three channels previously identified are considered below. 
Improved efficiency of intermediation 
With improved financial intermediation, the portion of notional saving that is diverted 
by the financial system into "nonproductive" uses falls, and the rate of capital 
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accumulation consequently increases, for a given saving rate.14 The parameter (1-$) 
is an index, among other things, of the resource cost of operating the financial 
system. Restrictions to entry into the financial system, high required reserve or 
liquidity ratios, ceilings on interest rates, and the other regulations that together 
comprise financial repression, can each increase the costs of financial intermediation. 
The first of these permits firms in the financial system to extract monopoly rents from 
savers and borrowers, while the second extracts resources for the government. The 
third diverts intermediation into the informal financial system, where the scale of 
operation may be inefficient, or abroad, from where it may not find its way back into 
domestic investment. 
Improved efficiency of the capital stock 
The monitoring function of financial institutions described above takes the form 
of measuring the marginal product of capital in alternative activities. A simple 
extension of the model described above, due to Easterly et al (1992), illustrates the 
role that funding high-return projects can play in sustaining high rates of economic 
growth. Suppose that the aggregate capital stock consists of two types of capital, K, 
and K2, which can be transformed into each other at a constant rate (perhaps because 
they are both traded goods, or because they are each made in the same way from 
some currently produced good). By choice of units, let one unit of K, be convertible 
into one unit of K2. Thus the aggregate capital stock is K, + K2 = K. Aggregate 
output takes the form: 
Y=F(KVK2) (5) 
a standard neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale. Dividing 
F by K2 and defining 6 = K,/K2, the production function can be written as: 
Y=F(Kl/K2,l)K2 
^ } ( t V
 (6) 
=A(6)K 
The effect is to make the productivity parameter a function of the allocation of the 
aggregate capital stock. Under present assumptions, the value of 6 that maximizes 
A satisfies: 
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(7) 
or: 
f(6)=m-f(0)0 (8) 
which is the requirement that the marginal product of the two types of capital be 
equalized. 
This outcome will emerge if financial institutions are able to identify the 
marginal product of capital in alternative uses, and channel funds in such as a way 
as to give priority to high-productivity projects. It is less likely to emerge under 
financial repression, for a variety of reasons: 
Whether interest rates are controlled at below-market levels or not, 
banks have to screen prospective credit applicants. When loan rates are 
high, part of this screening function is performed by the price system, 
which in effect truncates the distribution of projects that apply for funds, 
leaving only those with expected returns in excess of the prevailing 
interest rate.15 
Low interest rates in the formal financial system are likely to create an 
informal financial market. When formal and informal financial markets 
coexist and some firms have unlimited access to the formal market, the 
marginal product of capital in these "favoured" firms will fall below the 
cost of borrowing in the informal system. 
The appropriation of funds by the public sector through the maintenance 
of high reserve requirements means that a portion of household saving 
will be channeled into government spending. To the extent that the 
government consumes these resources, $ will fall. To the extent that 
they are invested in public capital, the associated projects may not yield 
returns in excess of the foregone investment in the private sector. 
Directed credit is often a component of financial repression, and 
favoured borrowers will by definition not be those that offer the highest 
prospective private returns on their projects, since otherwise they would 
have received funds anyway.16 
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• State-owned and subsidized banks will not have the competitive 
incentives to screen and monitor borrowers closely. 
Increases in the saving rate 
In the simple framework above, the saving rate is exogenous. To investigate the role 
of the financial sector in influencing aggregate saving, it is necessary to examine 
household saving behaviour. The upshot is that the effects of financial liberalization 
on household saving are ambiguous on theoretical grounds. 
The most familiar framework for private saving is based on analyzing the 
behaviour of a representative agent with an infinite horizon and additively-separable 
preferences. In this case, if the utility function is of the constant relative risk-
aversion (CRRA) type, the rate of growth of consumption over time is given by: 
c= o~\A-p], (9) 
where the inverse of a is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and p is the rate 
of time preference. With the same technology as before, from an arbitrary initial 
capital stock K0, the growth rate of output, consumption, and capital stock will 
eventually converge to the growth rate of consumption given by Equation (9), so we 
have: 
Y=o\A~p) (10> 
An increase in the real rate of return on capital A, then, is likely to twist the 
consumption path, depressing present consumption in favour of future consumption, 
to a degree that depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.17 Whether 
household saving increases or decreases, however, depends on whether this effect 
dominates the positive income effect on current consumption emanating from a higher 
present value of lifetime resources. 
Moreover, if utility is of the CRRA type, but the argument in the utility 
function is the excess of consumption over some subsistence level (rather than the 
level of consumption itself), then the intertemporal elasticity of consumption will be 
an inverse function of the initial level of consumption. This implies that 
"consumption twisting" in response to an increase in A will be weak in countries with 
low initial levels of per capita consumption. Further, this analysis assumes that 
financial liberalization affects household saving primarily through its effect of A. To 
the extent that it additionally serves to remove liquidity constraints faced by 
households under financial repression, this factor may lead to a reduction in saving.18 
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Interactions 
9 
Financial development may exert positive effects on growth by increasing the 
efficiency of the capital stock as well as by reducing the costs of operating the 
financial system. Effects operating through the saving rate are, however, 
theoretically ambiguous. It is worth noting that these channels of influence are not 
independent. In the basic model described above, for example, the adverse 
consequences of costs of financial intermediation for the growth rate depend on the 
volume of resources to be intermediated (s), as well as on the productivity of the 
investment foregone (A). 
Financial liberalization 
The preceding can be taken as a description of the ways in which having a well-
functioning, liberalized financial system may enhance economic growth relative to a 
situation in which the financial system is repressed. In other words, the description 
of potential channels of influence from an innovation in financial development to 
growth is based on a comparison of likely growth outcomes in two different financial-
system equilibria. Two important questions are left unanswered in this analysis, 
however. First, given that a repressed financial system suffers from an excessively 
heavy government hand, what is the residual role of the government in a well-
functioning system? Second, how does one achieve the transition from one type of 
system to the other? 
The role of government 
The paradigm described above makes it possible to specify a set of conditions that are 
conducive to the efficient functioning of the financial system. The maintenance of 
such conditions is the province of the government, so their specification provides one 
way to describe the minimal role of government. Such conditions include: 
• The existence of an appropriate legal framework, including well-
established property rights as well as an efficient judicial system. 
• The existence of a financial safety net (explicit or implicit deposit 
guarantees) to avoid liquidity crises. 
• The existence of an adequate regulatory and monitoring framework to 
prevent collusion and avoid excessive risk-taking due to moral hazard 
problems. 
• The existence of an at least potentially successful borrowing class. 
• A fiscal adjustment to replace the revenues previously received from 
financial repression. 
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The government has a role to play in establishing all of these conditions. The first 
three have to do with the institutional framework, while the last two relate to the 
macroeconomic environment. 
An appropriate legal framework is one in which property rights are well 
established, adequate accounting standards are in place, and the judicial system 
functions effectively to enforce contracts and punish fraud. Such a framework 
facilitates the use of collateral and lowers the costs of both monitoring and contract 
negotiation and enforcement. These circumstances combine to reduce the premium 
for external finance and thus expand the role of financial intermediation. 
Even in a deregulated financial system, it may be necessary for the government 
to operate a financial safety net in the form of an implicit deposit insurance system. 
The likelihood of financial panics under imperfect information, and the role of banks 
in the payments mechanism, probably mandate this result. However, if deposit 
insurance is improperly priced, even a competitive financial system could malfunction 
after liberalization unless it is adequately supervised, due to moral hazard problems. 
Moral hazard problems may arise, if the cost of deposit insurance to banks is 
unrelated to the riskiness of their portfolios. Bank shareholders then have much to 
gain and nothing to lose by undertaking risky lending, in effect making a one-way bet 
with the government. In the event of default, depositors are compensated by 
taxpayers, while in the event of unusual profits, stockholders reap the gains. Making 
the deposit-insurance system explicit and charging banks a fee in accordance with the 
riskiness of their portfolio may be the only way to avoid moral hazard problems. 
An effective supervisory and monitoring function would complement this, 
inducing liberalized institutions to behave in prudent fashion by monitoring their 
portfolios, ensuring that appropriate provisions are made against suspect loans, and 
that bank capital is adequate. A separate dimension to the government's regulatory 
function is the prohibition of collusion. In the absence of foreign competition (capital 
mobility), freeing the domestic financial system could result in noncompetitive 
behaviour, with low deposit rates and high lending rates providing substantial profit 
margins to colluding institutions. This would be more likely in countries with limited 
access to external finance, strong domestic banking associations, and limited 
supervisory mechanisms. 
The requirement that a class of successful borrowers be in place means at the 
very least that times of macroeconomic crisis are not auspicious for financial 
liberalization. Beyond this, however, it may also require the implementation of 
structural measures to foment a vigorous private sector. 
Finally, if other forms of revenue are not in place to replace those that the 
government was previously receiving from financial repression, inflation is the likely 
result. For a variety of reasons, the emergence of inflation may undermine the very 
growth process that financial liberalization is intended to promote. Thus, fiscal 
adjustment is an important component of financial liberalization. 
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Financial transition 
Though theory tells us that a well-functioning financial system can make an important 
contribution to fostering economic growth, the process of financial liberalization may 
prove to be difficult. Without the necessary preconditions in place, financial 
liberalization can go wrong, and not only may the favourable growth outcomes not 
be achieved, but the financial system may itself become a source of macroeconomic 
problems that undermine economic growth. 
The combination of macroeconomic instability, weak bank supervision, and 
freed interest rates seems most conducive to negative growth effects.19 
Macroeconomic instability increases the variance and covariance of a given set of 
projects in banks' portfolios, and weak supervision in the context of free (or 
underpriced) deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to endogenously increase 
the riskiness of the lending they choose to undertake. A strategy of paying high 
interest rates to attract deposits, and then investing these funds in high-risk projects 
with low expected returns, may maximize expected returns to the owners of the 
banks. When banks fail, the combination of macroeconomic crisis and lost 
information capital contributes to lower and poorer quality investment and reduced 
growth. 
With these considerations in mind, a sensible four-step liberalization sequence 
is proposed by Turtleboom (1991): 
1. Proceed simultaneously in restoring macroeconomic equilibrium and 
restructuring or liquidating insolvent financial institutions. The latter 
process should be initiated early, because it is likely to take time. 
2. Introduce indirect instruments of monetary controls with freely-
determined interest rates, such as treasury bills sold at auction. At the 
same time, establish supervisory guidelines regarding loan classification, 
provisioning for bad debt, interest rate capitalization, capital adequacy, 
and limits on portfolio concentration. 
3. Increase competition by granting more bank licenses, permitting the 
entrance of foreign banks, and privatizing government-owned banks. 
4. Remove interest rate controls and direct credit ceilings. 
This sequence involves putting the institutional and macroeconomic conditions in 
place before liberalization proper (in the form of step 4) is attempted. 
II Evidence 
Evidence on the links between financial intermediation and growth takes a variety of 
forms. King and Levine (1993) cite four such types of evidence: 
• Cross-country growth regressions; 
• Country case studies; 
• Industry studies; and 
• Studies of the effects of structural adjustment. 
Each of these will now be considered in turn. The coverage is not symmetric, 
however, because the evidence has been dominated by cross-country growth 
regressions and country case studies. 
Cross-country growth regressions 
The advent of the new growth theory has given rise to an outpouring of research in 
the form of regressions attempting to explain cross-country growth experience, 
following Barro (1991). The dependent variable in such regressions generally 
consists of the average growth rate registered by individual countries over some 
extended period of time. Explanatory variables typically include the initial level of 
per capita GDP, a human capital measure such as the secondary school enrollment 
rate, and a measure of political stability. Regional dummies, usually for Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa, are often included as well. 
The effects of particular policy variables on the long-run growth rate are then 
tested by adding the relevant variable to the "core" regression, to see whether the 
variable exhibits a significant partial correlation with the average growth rate. If so, 
then the question arises as to whether the relevant variable affects the growth rate 
primarily by inducing greater accumulation of productive resources or by enhancing 
the efficiency of resource use. This is tested by adding the investment rate to the 
growth equation and determining whether the coefficient on the relevant variable 
retains its sign and statistical significance. If so, then an efficiency effect is detected. 
If not, and if the variable is significant in an equation similar to the "core" regression 
but with the investment rate as the dependent variable, then its association with 
growth is attributed to a resource-accumulation effect. 
Several such exercises have been conducted with a focus on the role of 
financial development. The methodology involves adding an indicator of the 
adequacy of financial intermediation either to the core regression or to one that 
includes other potential determinants of growth, such as openness, government size, 
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the conduct of monetary policy, etc. A large number of variables has been used as 
proxies for financial development. The list includes: 
a. Indicators of financial depth, such as the ratios of narrow (Ml) and broad (M2) 
money, of quasi-money, and of liquid liabilities (currency outside banks plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial 
intermediaries) to GDP. 
b. The share of financial intermediation done by commercial banks (measured by 
the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to the domestic assets of 
deposit money banks and the central bank together, as in King and Levine, 
1992, 1993. 
c. The volume of lending to the private sector, measured by ratio of flow of 
credit to the private sector to GDP, as in De Gregorio and Guidotti (1992), or 
by the share of total domestic banking-system credit extended to the private (as 
opposed to the public) sector (King and Levine, 1992, 1993. 
d. Direct indicators of financial repression, such as the reserve ratio (Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992a), or the ex post real interest rate (Gelb, 1989), King and 
Levine (1992)). 
What can we learn from such studies?20 As argued by Levine and Zavos (1993), the 
best we can hope for is to extract a set of suggestive empirical regularities from the 
data. Such studies suffer from several methodological difficulties. The most obvious 
of these is heterogeneity among countries. This means that what can emerge at best 
is an "average" relationship, not particularly applicable to any single country. A 
second serious problem with cross-country growth regressions is the lack of 
robustness of the results. That is, the variable of interest may cease to enter the 
regression with a coefficient that bears the theoretically-expected sign and is 
statistically significant once other "reasonable" variables are added to the growth 
regression.21 Unfortunately, few of the variables typically included in such 
regressions exhibit this property. 
Even if such estimates can be shown to be robust, what the parameters measure 
is the strength of a partial correlation. Policy interpretations are problematic. The 
first problem concerns direction of causation. In cross-country regressions this is an 
open issue. Thus a positive and significant sign on a financial indicator is consistent 
with the theory discussed above, but need not suggest that financial liberalization 
promotes growth.22 Finally, even if one is willing to posit causation from the 
financial variable to growth, the explanatory variable typically included is not a policy 
variable, but a performance indicator that is endogenous to policy. Thus the 
coefficient cannot be interpreted as revealing the long-run growth effect of a given 
change in policy. 
All of this being said, some of the existing work has addressed these problems. 
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Heterogeneity has been tested by including slope and/or shift dummies for regions; 
robustness has been investigated through sensitivity analyses; and causation has been 
addressed by using initial values of explanatory variables, rather than average values 
during the sample period. Finally, alternative proxies for policy have been tried. A 
selection of recent work that has confronted these problems is reviewed below. 
A recent paper by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992b) examined alternative 
indicators of financial repression (a real interest rate dummy, the reserve ratio, and 
inflation). The paper found them all to be negatively correlated with growth in a 
regression that controlled for standard Barro (1991) growth determinants for a large 
cross-country sample of countries. Interestingly, Barro's finding that growth 
performance in African countries was not fully explained by his standard set of 
explanatory variables (because a dummy for Africa was significant in his growth 
regression) remained when both trade and financial distortions were added to these 
determinants by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin. The latter did not test, however, whether 
the coefficients of their financial variables differed for Africa. 
The most comprehensive study of the cross-country type that addressed the 
robustness issue is by King and Levine (1993). In a sample of 77 countries with data 
averaged from 1960 to 1989, these authors found that their financial indicators were 
closely correlated with each other as well as with measures of GDP growth, capital 
accumulation, and total factor productivity. In standard cross-country growth 
regressions applied to each of these growth indicators, they found that, when entered 
separately, the average value of each of the financial indicators was statistically 
significant at the 5% level. These results were confirmed with pooled cross section 
time series regressions using decade averages and instrumental variables techniques. 
They also found that initial financial depth helped to explain subsequent growth 
performance, again using a variety of indicators both of growth as well as of financial 
depth. All of these results tended to be robust across samples of countries and time 
periods, as well as with respect to the set of other explanatory variables included in 
the regressions. In particular, the results were the same for sub-Saharan African 
countries as for the full sample.23 
Finally, King and Levine (1992) explored the channels of influence between 
financial development and growth. Using the same indicators of financial depth as 
King and Levine (1993), they found that average financial depth was robustly 
correlated with both the investment/GDP ratio and a measure of the efficiency of 
investment (the inverse of ICOR) in a cross-section sample, while initial financial 
depth was insignificantly correlated with both. In pooled cross-section time series 
regressions, financial size was positively correlated with the investment share, but 
negatively correlated with the efficiency of investment. In this sample, both the share 
of deposit money bank assets in total assets and the share of banking-system assets 
allocated to the private sector were positively and significantly correlated with growth 
through the investment channel in cross section, and through both the investment and 
efficiency channels in the pooled regressions. 
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Country case studies 
Most of the recent empirical work on this issue has taken the cross-country approach 
outlined above. What little country-specific evidence exists tends to be in the form 
of country case studies. The methodology is descriptive, and the effects of reforms 
are typically based on before-and-after examination of the data, thereby failing to 
control for other influences on the variables of interest. An extensive older literature 
of this type analyzed the financial liberalization experience of the Southern Cone 
countries in South America. As already indicated, this literature's conclusions were 
that the liberalization effort failed there because the process was undertaken in an 
unstable macroeconomic setting and under an unsatisfactory regulatory framework. 
The experience of Asian countries is less well known. An overview of 
financial liberalization in several of these countries during the 1980s is provided in 
Tseng and Corker (1991), as well as the World Bank (1994a). The experience of 
these countries can be summarized as follows: 
• The scope of liberalization has been broad. Liberalization was 
accompanied by measures to promote competition, such as increased 
freedom of entry, expanding the scope of permissible activities for 
different institutions, and relaxing restrictions on foreign banks. The 
supervisory framework for the financial system was typically 
strengthened by centralizing supervisory responsibilities, developing and 
unifying the regulatory framework (as well as extending it to nonbanks), 
and providing explicit deposit insurance. Money markets were fostered 
by creating new instruments (such as central bank and government 
securities) with flexible interest rates. 
0 However, the pace of liberalization in Asia has been gradual, and 
sometimes partial. Interest rates, for example, were not always fully 
liberalized. Sometimes (as in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), managed 
rates were simply adjusted more frequently. Also, while total credit 
controls were eliminated, sectoral credit allocation requirements and 
selective rediscounting remained in place for some time in many of these 
countries. 
• The financial results of liberalization have not been disruptive, as they 
were in the Southern Cone. Liberalization of interest rates tended to 
increase nominal rates, but not necessarily enough to establish positive 
real rates. In some countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) positive real rates 
were attained by changes in nominal rates, while in others (Korea, 
Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), positive rates were 
achieved through a reduction of inflation. Yet in all of the liberalizing 
countries, positive real rates followed liberalization, and financial 
deepening followed in most of them. 
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Whether liberalization has been accompanied by desirable growth effects is another 
matter entirely. The difficulty, of course, is in controlling for other factors that were 
influencing macroeconomic performance in the liberalizing countries at the same time. 
Country-specific work on the issue of financial reform has not been associated 
with the new growth literature, with few exceptions. King and Levine (1993), for 
example, looked at the behaviour of their financial indicators before and after 
financial reforms in five countries. They found that all four indicators increased, and 
that the ratio of currency to demand deposits fell, in Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, 
Korea, and the Philippines. During all episodes but one, the real interest rate also 
rose after the reform. Again, these authors did not try to link these phenomena with 
subsequent growth performance. 
Firm-level studies 
A small number of studies have examined the effect of financial liberalization on the 
distribution of bank credit among firms of varying degrees of efficiency. Such 
studies use firm-level data to estimate production functions, and then measure each 
firm's technical efficiency by looking at how far it is from the production frontier. 
Several studies of this type, cited in King and Levine (1993), found that financial 
liberalization tended to redirect credit to the more efficient firms. 
Structural adjustment 
The role of financial institutions as described in Section I suggests that structural 
adjustment measures are more likely to promote growth under a well-functioning 
financial system, and that a given set of growth-enhancing measures is more likely 
to be successful if accompanied by a financial reform. Thus King and Levine looked 
at the relationship between their financial indicators and the success of World Bank 
adjustment lending. They found that intensive-adjustment-lending countries with 
better initial financial depth tended to grow faster during the subsequent five years. 
This relationship held up after correcting for other growth determinants. 
Ill Sub-Saharan Africa: Country-specific 
experiences 
Theory and evidence, then, suggest that a well-functioning financial system, perhaps 
achieved by removing financial repression through a judicious financial liberalization, 
can make an important contribution to the stimulation of economic growth. What is 
the scope for a favourable policy-induced innovation to financial development in sub-
Saharan Africa? This depends on the institutional and policy conditions currently 
prevailing among the countries in the subcontinent. These issues are addressed in this 
section, which deals with the 1) structure of the financial system in sub-Saharan 
African countries, 2) the nature of policies directed to the financial system, and 3) the 
experience with financial liberalization in the region. 
Financial structure 
Information on the financial structure of sub-Saharan African countries is not widely 
available. The overview presented here is based on country-specific information for 
six countries, described in an appendix.24 Overall, the financial systems in these 
countries fit the paradigm outlined previously rather well. The countries in the region 
are among the poorest in the world, and their stage of financial development is one 
where net worth and collateral availability among borrowers is such that external 
finance continues to be tied to evaluating and monitoring functions on the part of 
lenders. 
By and large the formal financial sectors of these economies are dominated by 
a small number of commercial banks.25 Non-bank intermediaries tend to be small and 
few in number. Stock exchanges exist in some countries, but do not account for a 
significant share of financing of business enterprises. In the commercial banking 
sector, deposits tend to be concentrated in the few largest banks, and public 
ownership of the most important banks is common.26 The regulatory structure is not 
always well developed and is sometimes splintered, with banks and non-banks subject 
to very different regulatory environments. According to the World Bank (1994b): 
Bank supervision is essentially nonexistent in countries where t h e 
banking system has been nationalized. Even in countries with 
nominally private banks, there may be a conflict of interest because 
members of the supervisory agencies often sit on the boards of the 
banking institutions. In most instances, prudential ratios have been 
ineffective in preventing the degradation of loan portfolios. The ratios 
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sometimes were poorly designed or lacked rules for classifying credit 
according to risk, for defining and handling delinquent loans (p. 
114). 
Moreover, directed credit is common, and the quality of bank portfolios is often 
poor. Banks in some countries appear to hold substantial amounts of excess reserves. 
An informal financial sector characterized by small-scale transactions, and often based 
on preexisting social and economic relationships, parallels and complements the 
formal one. Data on its magnitude are scarce, but the opinion is that it may be quite 
large in several countries.27 
Financial policies 
As indicated previously, governments resort to financial repression primarily as a 
form of taxation. The government uses the financial system as a way to extract 
resources by levying an inflation tax on currency, by direct borrowing from banks 
at less than market rates through the imposition of interest rate ceilings, and by 
coopting resources through unremunerated reserve requirements. One way to detect 
the prevalence of financial repression, then, is to measure the volume of resources 
extracted from the financial system through these means. This was recently done for 
a broad group of countries by Giovanninni and De Melo (1993), for five sub-Saharan 
African countries by Chamley and Honohan (1990), and for eight such countries by 
Ikhide (1992). 
Giovanninni and De Melo estimated the revenue from financial repression by 
calculating the interest saving on central government domestic debt achieved by 
countries that used financial repression to keep domestic interest rates below the 
external cost of funds. Unfortunately, their sample included only two sub-Saharan 
African countries, Zaire and Zimbabwe. For both of these countries, however, 
financial repression made an important contribution to government revenues, 
amounting to 2.5% of GDP in Zaire during 1974-86 and about 19% of GDP in 
Zimbabwe during 1981-86. 
Chamley and Honohan constructed a broader measure of the revenues derived 
from financial repression. They estimated the volume of resources extracted from the 
financial system through implicit and explicit taxation by using the following formula: 
TAX = (R* - 0.01)*CURRENCY + (R* - RRES)*RESERVES + (R* - RTB)* 
GOVTBOR + (R* - RTB + MARGIN)*NONGOVTBOR + INDIRECT TAXES 
Here R* is an estimate of the market-clearing risk-free interest rate that would prevail 
without interest rate ceilings, RRES is the rate of remuneration on reserves, RTB is 
the bank lending rate, MARGIN is an assumed risk premium for private borrowers, 
and GOVTBOR and NONGOVTBOR are the stocks of loans outstanding to the 
government and nongovernment sectors, respectively. Estimates of TAX were 
calculated for five sub-Saharan African countries (Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
FINANCIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 9 
Nigeria, and Zambia) over the period 1978-1988. 
Total tax revenues derived in this fashion were in the range of 4-7% of GDP 
for Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia, and of 2% for Cote d'lvoire and Kenya. These 
figures compare with total tax revenue in the range of 10-25% of GDP for sub-
Saharan African countries, leading the authors to conclude that: 
By any reckoning, the financial sector has been very heavily taxed in 
comparison with other sectors. For instance, the average tax 
collected has in all cases exceeded the value added of the banking 
system. Even excluding the currency tax, which does not bear 
directly on the banking system, the average tax collected has been a 
multiple of the value added of the banking system in the three high-
tax countries (p. 16). 
These results are supported by those of Ikhide (1992), who focused only on 
implicit taxation in the form of unremunerated reserve requirements. He found that 
such reserves were significantly higher in the eight sub-Saharan countries in his 
sample than is typical in OECD countries, and that the implicit tax on the financial 
sector just from this source ranged from about 1.5% of GDP in Tanzania to about 
7.5% in Ethiopia. In five of the eight countries he examined, this amounted to more 
than a quarter of government revenue. 
In sum, the available evidence paints a consistent picture. Using the 
magnitude of government revenue from financial repression as an indicator of the 
intensity of repressive policies toward the banking system, the historical record 
suggests that sub-Saharan African countries fit squarely within the financial repression 
paradigm. 
Financial liberalization 
As indicated previously, financial liberalization can in principle include a variety of 
measures, such as interest rate liberalization, the establishment of freedom of entry 
into and procedures for orderly exit from the banking industry, the reduction of 
reserve and liquidity requirements, the elimination or minimization of credit allocation 
directives, and the elimination of preferential credit at concessional interest rates. 
By and large, financial liberalization has taken place in Africa only very 
recently (since the mid-eighties). The adoption of some form of liberalization or bank 
restructuring measures has been fairly widespread,28 and a partial list of recent 
measures is provided in Table l.29 In addition to the countries listed in the table, 
interest rates had been freed by the end of 1992 in Burundi, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
and Zambia. Many other countries moved from setting rates to setting minimum 
deposit and maximum lending rates, or to regulating spreads. 
However, low positive real interest rates have not been the rule after 
liberalization. Countries have tended either to continue to have negative interest rates 
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Table 1 Financial liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa 
The Gambia (September 1985): Ceilings on interest rates were removed in September 
1985, an auction system for issuing Treasury bills was 
introduced in July 1985, and quantitative controls on 
credit were removed in September 1990. 
Nigeria (July 1987): Directed credit restrictions were relaxed over the period 
1983-1987 by increasing the sectoral aggregation of 
directed credit allocations. On July 31, 1 987, the central 
bank removed interest rate controls, and raised both the 
treasury bill and rediscount rates by 4 % points, to 1 5 and 
14%. In November 1989, an auction system was 
instituted for treasury bills and certificates but, the central 
bank retained a reservation price. 
Ghana (September 1987): Ceilings on interest rates were removed, while the 
removal of quantitative credit controls was scheduled for 
1992. 
Malawi (April 1988): Ceilings on interest rates were removed, and quantitative 
credit ceilings were eliminated in January 1991. 
Uganda (July 1988): In July 1, 1988, an increase of 10% points was 
announced on most interest rates. 
Benin and C6te d'lvoire 
(October 1990): 
The BCEAO abolished its preferential discount rate, but 
bank interest rates remained subject to regulation. Cote 
d'lvoire is also a member of the BCEAO, so it was 
affected by these liberalizing measures. 
Cameroon (October 1990): The BEAC eliminated its preferential lending rates, 
simplified its interest rate structure, and increased its 
power to determine interst rate policy wi th the intention 
to move toward greater flexibility in rates. 
Tanzania (July 1991): The system of fixed interest rates and fixed differentials 
was replaced by a single maximum lending rate of 3 1 % 
on July 25. 
Kenya (July 1991): Interest rate ceilings were removed 
FINANCIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 1 
or, in the case of those with fixed exchange rates and currencies that have been 
overvalued, high positive rates. In part this may reflect the incomplete nature of the 
liberalization. In the case of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) 
of the West African Monetary Union, for example, the abolition of the bank's 
preferential discount rate in October of 1989 left interest rate controls in place. The 
same was true of the Central Bank of the Central African States (BECEA), which 
abolished its preferential discount rate in October 1990. While Nigeria removed 
interest rate controls in July of 1987 and introduced treasury bill auctions in 
November 1989, it continued to exert influences over interest rates through the 
reservation prices set by the central bank. Some adjustments to previously fixed 
interest rates were recorded in Tanzania in 1991 and Uganda in 1988, but neither 
country moved immediately to flexible interest rate determination. Other possible 
explanations for the behaviour of real interest rates after liberalization are lack of 
competition due to the small number of banks and the continued role of government-
owned institutions.30 
In addition to the behaviour of real interest rates, widening spreads between 
lending and deposit rates appear to have been a problem in several sub-Saharan 
African countries that liberalized interest rates during the 1980s (Gambia, Ghana, 
Malawi, and Nigeria, according to Turtleboom, 1991. Again, lack of competition 
is a possible explanation, as is the continued presence of nonperforming loans. 
Regarding the latter, the experience with bank restructurings also appears 
unfortunately not to have been favourable. Recapitalization operations have tended 
to be expensive, recovery of nonperforming assets has been poor, and restructuring 
operations have had to be repeated in several cases (World Bank, 1994b). In Ghana, 
for example, nonperforming assets restructured under a plan undertaken in 1989 
amounted to 41% of total bank credit to the non-government sector (Kapur et al, 
1991). 
IV Researchable issues in the African context 
The force of theory and evidence from Sections I and II suggests that financial 
development can contribute to economic growth in the long run. The country-specific 
evidence for sub-Saharan Africa presented in Section III, on the other hand, suggests 
that most sub-Saharan African countries are at an early stage of financial development 
where commercial banks continue to dominate the formal financial system, the 
number of banks is small, and government ownership of banks is common. Policy 
toward the banking sector in these countries, moreover, has tended to fit the general 
characteristics of financial repression. Finally, financial liberalization, though 
recently undertaken in various countries of the region, has been tentative and has thus 
far not appeared to be very successful. Thus, in the long run further financial 
liberalization is likely to be desirable in sub-Saharan Africa. 
As argued in the last part of Section I, however, successful financial 
liberalization presents a difficult and multidimensional policy challenge. The issue 
confronting policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, is not whether further 
financial liberalization is desirable, but rather when and how it should be brought 
about. 
The contributions that research can make to answering these questions are 
unlikely to come from further cross-country work. Some interest attaches to 
assessments of whether Africa is different in cross-country studies along the financial 
dimension, i.e., whether financial variables appear to have the same effect on growth 
in Africa as they do elsewhere. The available evidence (King and Levine, 1993) 
suggests they do, but in view of the difficulty in explaining the Africa dummy in 
cross-country growth regressions, this issue may merit further study. The results of 
such studies may assist policy-makers if they help to identify the conditions under 
which financial repression will be particularly costly or, conversely, under which 
financial liberalization can be particularly beneficial, since this could help to assess 
the urgency of further movement in the direction of liberalization for specific 
countries. But such studies are unlikely to help in the design of intensified financial 
liberalization strategies for sub-Saharan Africa. 
A higher research priority should go to country-specific work. Here the first 
order of business might be to study the experience of countries such as those listed 
in Table 1 — i.e., those countries that have already begun to liberalize their financial 
systems — to draw lessons for how liberalization should proceed. The post-
liberalization behaviour of real interest rates and of spreads between borrowing and 
lending rates needs to be understood, as do the problems associated with 
restructuring. Are low real interest rates due to the absence of competition, or to 
incomplete liberalization? Are the high spreads due to collusion, to the presence of 
nonperforming loans in the portfolio, or to some other cause? Why have restructured 
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banks gotten in trouble again? What has happened to the revenues from financial 
repression in liberalizing countries? Has the appropriate magnitude of fiscal 
adjustment accompanied these revenue changes? If not, how has macroeconomic 
performance been affected? The answers to these questions are likely to be of great 
interest to countries in sub-Saharan Africa contemplating intensifying the process of 
financial liberalization. 
Beyond this, research should focus on assessing whether the preconditions for 
successful financial liberalization are indeed in place in countries where the process 
has not yet begun or for more complete liberalization where moves have been partial. 
This could involve various components: 
a. Description and measurement of regulatory taxation of the financial system. 
The purpose would be to measure the severity of remaining financial repression 
as well as to identify the required forms of liberalization. More importantly, 
however, it would help to quantify the size of the fiscal adjustment required to 
compensate for losses of financial repression revenues as liberalization 
proceeds. 
b. Evaluation of the practice and economic rationale for directed credit. In 
particular, the focus should be on whether there is any scope for directed credit 
in a reformed and liberalized financial system, based on high social (but not 
necessarily private) rates of return, or on incentive effects of credit availability. 
c. Evaluation of the institutional framework. This involves identification of 
possible improvements in accounting standards (to facilitate monitoring), in the 
system of property rights (to permit borrowers to offer collateral), of the costs 
of contract enforcement (efficiency and impartiality of the court system), as 
well as analysis and evaluation of the existing system of bank supervision. 
d. Analysis of the industrial structure of the financial system, including types of 
institutions, number of banks, ownership of banks, sizes and roles of the non-
bank sector and the informal market. The goal would be to identify possible 
barriers to entry and the scope for collusion. 
e. Assessment of the scope for disciplining the behaviour of a liberalized banking 
system through capital mobility. This is obviously related to (d), since both 
have to do with the likely competitive structure of a liberalized domestic 
financial system. 
This list is narrowly focused on the workings of the financial system itself. Missing 
from it is any reference to assessing the potential health of the domestic private 
sector. While this topic is much too broad to include in a list of "researchable 
issues," it may well be the most important from a policy standpoint. As indicated 
previously, the success of financial liberalization and the emergence of a successful 
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borrowing class are interdependent. Thus the identification of real-sector policies 
conducive to the creation of a vigorous private entrepreneurial class is also an 
important research issue in the area of financial development. 
Appendix: Financial structure in selected 
African countries 
The summary description of financial structure in sub-Saharan Africa is based on a 
sample for six countries for which this information was available. These countries 
are Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, and Tanzania. 
Ghana 
The formal financial system in Ghana consists of 13 commercial and secondary 
banks, some small rural banks, 20 insurance companies (not regulated by the banking 
law), and a small (11 listed companies) stock exchange, that began operations in 
November 1990 (see Kapur et al., 1991). As of the end of 1990, the three largest 
banks contained 73% of all bank deposits, and the government and the Social Security 
National Insurance Trust had a majority stake in 8 of the 13 banks. A large number 
of nonperforming assets led to an attempt to upgrade the financial system under a 
financial sector reform program that has been under way since early 1988. 
According to Nissanke (1991), the informal financial sector plays an important role 
in Ghana, with informal financial saving amounting to about 2% of GDP. The 
functioning of the informal sector in Ghana is described by Aryeetey (1992). 
Gambia 
I 
The financial system in Gambia consists of four commercial banks, a postal savings 
bank, two insurance companies, and the Social Security and Housing Finance 
Corporation. The largest bank was government-owned up to 1992 (it was sold in 
June of that year), and controls 44% of deposits. As in Ghana, restructuring of the 
assets of the financial system has been under way since 1988 (see Hadjimichael et al., 
1992). 
Kenya 
Kenya has a much larger financial sector than Ghana or Gambia, consisting of 88 
banks, many non-bank financial institutions, and a long-established, but still small, 
stock exchange. The largest commercial bank is government-owned. The banks and 
non-banks are regulated separately, but a Deposit Protection Fund set up in 1986 
protects deposits in both types of institutions. 
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Nigeria 
Nigeria has a large banking system, consisting of 109 banks. The top five banks, 
however, account for 47% of all deposits. The federal and state governments control 
40% of the commercial banks. There is a vigorous stock exchange, but most capital 
is still raised through the banking system. 
Malawi 
Malawi has two commercial banks, three development finance institutions, two 
finance houses, the New Building Society, the Post Office Savings Bank, some 
insurance companies, and the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives, an 
umbrella organization for 58 credit unions.31 Both commercial banks are government-
controlled, and they held 68% of the total assets of the formal financial system as of 
1987. Little harmonization exists in the regulatory framework among the banks and 
non-banks. Nissanke (1991) reports that informal sector lending to the private sector 
in Malawi was at least three times as great as that of the formal sector. Supporting 
evidence is provided by Chipeta and Mkandawire (1992). 
Tanzania 
The formal financial sector in Tanzania consists of three commercial banks, three 
near-banks, two insurance companies, and several development finance companies 
(Hyuha et al., 1993). Though estimates of the relative size of the informal financial 
sector are not available, survey data collected by Hyuha et al suggest that informal 
finance plays an important role in the economy. 
Notes 
1. I am thankful to Jose De Gregorio, Mohsin S. Khan, Se-jik Kim, and the 
participants in an AERC workshop for their comments on an earlier draft. 
Remaining errors are my responsibility. 
2. See World Bank (1994b). 
3. See, for example, Gertler and Rose (1991), on which the discussion that 
follows is based. 
4. In keeping with this view, Stiglitz (1993) refers to the financial sector as the 
"brains" of the economy. 
5. As emphasized by Gertler (1987), this is a consequence of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem on the indeterminacy of financial structure in an Arrow-Debreu 
world. 
6. Borrowers have an incentive to appropriate the resources provided by the 
lenders by, for example, shirking. This would then be disguised by 
misrepresenting the outcome of the project. 
7. Such costs may include, for example, the acquisition of expertise required to 
evaluate any investment project; but once acquired, it can be applied to 
evaluate new projects at low marginal cost. 
8. Why don't such firms simply sell this information to potential lenders? One 
possibility is that the information is not worth much to potential buyers who 
cannot independently corroborate. 
9. See also King and Levine (1993). 
10. By making their liabilities more attractive, this lowers the cost of external 
funds for intermediaries. 
11. This direction of causation also holds in the short run. When the 
macroeconomic environment is favourable, borrowers' net worth will be 
increased and the cost of financial intermediation will be lower. 
12. This formulation is taken from Pagano (1993). 
28 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21, 
2 2 , 
23 
24, 
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This is the case in sub-Saharan Africa, as shown in Section III. 
In effect, saving by the household sector is partly offset by financial-sector dis-
saving. 
A counter-argument, however, is that adverse selection and adverse incentives 
may reduce the quality of prospective borrowers at higher interest rates. See 
Stiglitz (1993). 
Again, Stiglitz offers a counter-argument. The social return on projects 
receiving directed credit may exceed their private returns (Stiglitz, 1993). 
Moreover, for a given value of A, anything that increases the extent to which 
this rate of return is passed on to savers (e.g., low reserve requirements, more 
competition) will similarly affect the consumption path. 
See Japelli and Pagano (1994). 
See Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990). 
A systematic analysis of the problems associated with the application of cross-
country regressions to learn about the effects of policies on growth is given by 
Levine and Renelt (1991). 
See Levine and Renelt (1991). 
One way to ease this problem is to include only initial values of financial 
indicators on the right-hand side. 
Levine and Zervos (1993) replicated these results using an alternative "core" 
regression. 
The descriptions in the appendix were primarily based on a study of five 
African countries by Turtleboom (1990). See also Nissanke (1991), as well as 
the AERC studies cited in the appendix. 
According to the World Bank (1994b), most countries have less than ten banks, 
and only Cote d'lvoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have six or 
more private banks. 
In 1990, the government was the majority owner of all banks in Congo and 
Tanzania, and in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Gabon, 
Mauritania and Malawi, the government held a stake in all banks (World Bank 
1994b). 
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27. For descriptions of the role of the informal financial sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa, see Aryeetey (1992), Chipeta and Mkandawire (1992), Aredo (1993), 
and Hyuha et al., (1993). 
28. The World Bank (1994b) lists a total of 19 sub-Saharan African countries that 
have undertaken some form of liberalization measure in the financial sector 
since the mid-eighties. 
29. The information in Table 1 is drawn from Turtleboom (1991) and Galbis 
(1993). 
30. The World Bank (1994b) reports that the number of commercial banks in sub-
Saharan Africa in which the government retains a majority share fell from 108 
in 1982 to 1989 in 1992. 
31. As reported by Nissanke (1991). 
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